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Abstract
This article explores how the concept of minority national-cultural autonomy (NCA) has been defined and
practiced in contemporary Estonia, combining data from interviews and previously unanalyzed archival
sources to trace debates and policymaking processes back to 1988 and ascertain: why (and for whom) NCA
was adopted; the functions ascribed toNCA institutions; and the effectiveness and legitimacy of themodel in
the eyes of different “noncore” ethnic communities. In so doing, the article uses NCA as a fresh lens for
analyzing themore general politics of post-Soviet state and nation-building in the country, situating this case
within the “Quadratic Nexus” framework. Estonia’s NCA law is generally viewed as irrelevant to ongoing
issues of diversity governance in the country. However, Finnish and Swedish minority autonomies have
been established and, in recent years, there have been three applications to establish a Russian NCA. None
have been approved, and yet some authors see them as evidence that NCA could (and should) have a role to
play in bringing about a more meaningful accommodation of ethnic diversity. Having reviewed the
evidence, however, the article concludes that this claim is misplaced.
Keywords: minority rights; autonomy; Europeanization; Estonia; Quadratic Nexus
Introduction
During the past 25 years, several states in post-communist Central and Eastern Europe have adopted
institutional frameworks based on the concept of minority national-cultural autonomy (also known
as nonterritorial autonomy, hereafter NCA). During the same period, the Organization for Cooper-
ation and Security in Europe (OSCE) has cited NCA as a potentially promising means of promoting
effective participation in public life by persons belonging to minorities and thereby building more
integrated societies in the region (OSCE 1999; OSCE 2012). Further research is needed, however, on
why and how theNCAmodel was adopted in different states, and on the intersection of domestic and
international factors as well as (pre-)communist legacies and post-communist processes of
Europeanization within this process. Moreover, there is considerable cross-case variation in how
“autonomy” is defined, the functions thatNCA institutions perform, and the broader political systems
within which they operate, raising the question of the extent to which this arrangement actually
conforms to the OSCE vision (Malloy 2015). It is also clear that minority actors across the region
present diverse claims based on different circumstances, and that, in this respect, one has to bewary of
“prescribing uniform solutions for diverse needs” (Purger 2012, 2).1
Addressing these questions of “what, why and for whom?” with regard to NCA offers a useful
lens for analyzing the wider politics of post-communist state and nation-building in particular
countries and the factors that determine whether these pursue exclusion, assimilation/integration,
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or accommodation toward different noncore ethnic groups within the population (Mylonas 2013).
The present article examines the case of NCA in contemporary Estonia, which it situates within the
framework of a “Quadratic Nexus” linking the interaction of state, minority, and “external
homeland” nationalisms first propounded by Rogers Brubaker (1996) with the field of international
minority rights norms that has taken shape since the end of the Cold War (Smith 2002a). As well
as analyzing the nature, implementation, and reception of Estonia’s 1993 NCA law, the article
uses interviews and archival sources to trace the process of the law’s adoption right back to the late
1980s—a task never fully undertaken before now. It begins by briefly outlining current theoretical
thinking around NCA, before introducing the Estonian case and the continuing debate on the role
and relevance of NCA in a present-day context. Key aspects of this debate are then elucidated by
using the Quadratic Nexus to revisit the process of adopting an NCA law during 1988–1993,
informing conclusions which reflect more broadly on the state-building process.
National-Cultural Autonomy
First developed in late-Habsburg Austria by the Social Democrats Karl Renner and Otto Bauer, the
concept of national-cultural autonomy today denotes a variety of organizational forms and
practices found in ethno-culturally diverse polities across the world. In theoretical terms, it implies
recognition that a given society is composed of different ethnic communities, each of which has the
right to inter-generational reproduction of its particular collective identity. NCA allows each
community the possibility to establish institutions geared to this end, with self-governing powers
in relation to education and other spheres connected to the preservation of language and culture.
These powers, however, are devolved not to a designated territorial sub-region (“ethnic homeland”)
but to a community of persons identifying with the relevant culture, regardless of where they reside
within the state territory. This is done on the basis of individual citizens declaring identification
with the culture in question and voluntarily enrolling to elect cultural self-governments with a state-
wide remit (Renner 2005).
While Renner and Bauer’s model was never fully implemented in its original setting, it did
inform diversity governance in inter-war Estonia, whose 1925minority law is routinely cited as one
of the best-functioning historic examples of NCA (Coakley 1994). The NCA approach has attracted
renewed interest over the past 25 years, from scholars of ethnic conflict regulation but also from key
individuals and organizations involved in elaboration of the post-ColdWar international minority
rights regime (Kymlicka 2007; Buquicchio 2008). In both cases, NCA is portrayed as a potentially
promising mechanism for boosting political stability and social cohesion within states, by enabling
nationalminorities to participate fully and effectively in public life. NCA is seen as having particular
merit because it grants these possibilities to minority communities while avoiding any explicit
institutional linkage between ethnicity and territory (Roshwald 2007; Coakley 2016). State gov-
ernments, it is reasoned, are invariably reluctant to countenance minority claims for territorial
autonomy, since they see this as undermining their sovereignty as well as potentially threatening the
integrity of the state. Other authors, though, reject the notion that minority claims can be entirely
divorced from territory, noting that while NCA might work as a stand-alone solution for numer-
ically small and scattered groups, it is more typically used as a complement to other, territorially-
based arrangements (Kymlicka 2007; Purger 2012). Moreover, it is argued, forms of territorial
autonomy have become increasingly commonplace within consolidated democracies over the past
half century. Thus, rather than engaging in a fruitless quest to deterritorialize all minority identities,
it would be better to focus on liberalizing and democratizing sub-state nationalisms and “[embed-
ding] aspirations for self-government within a larger liberal-democratic constitutional framework”
(Kymlicka 2007, 388).
Reflecting on the recent growth of scholarship in this area, however, Alexander Osipov (2010,
30) highlights a preponderance of normatively-based legal and political-philosophical approaches
and a consequent “focus onwhat could and should be done rather than on analyzing and describing
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what, in fact, exists.” Tove Malloy (2015, 3–5) similarly notes that while there are numerous
arrangements across the world bearing the title of NCA, the use of the term is still beset by an
absence of conceptual clarity. Malloy ascribes this to inadequate description of autonomy bodies’
functionality, plus insufficient contextual knowledge of the broader institutional frames within
which the bodies operate and the “hidden agendas” that sometimes lie behind NCA policies. Thus,
when analyzing particular NCA arrangements, it is important to consider not only the powers held
by the autonomy bodies themselves, but also the overall openness of the political system tominority
participation. A further fundamental question relates to how “minority” is defined: for instance,
does a polity recognize the claims of all minorities to existence? If so, does it provide equal
entitlement to establish self-governing institutions? (Székely and Horváth 2014).
In assessing various NCA arrangements and their underlying political contexts, Malloy focuses
on the extent to which these give minority communities “voice” in decision-making on issues
relevant to the preservation of their identity. She thereby distinguishes between systems that confer
“voice through institutions of self-governing,” “quasi-voice” (delegation of certain public functions
tominority institutions without giving them substantial powers of self-rule or self-management), or
“nonvoice.” In the latter instance, “autonomy” amounts to no more than symbolic recognition of
particular minority communities, with no effective powers of self-governance or co-decision-
making. Here, autonomy is typically deployed as a discursive device/co-optative mechanism within
a system of hegemonic control by an ethno-national majority, rather than forming part of an
accommodationist approach. How, then, should NCA in contemporary Estonia be situated within
this framework?
NCA in Estonia: Symbolism or Substance?
Most general accounts of NCAmake some reference to Estonia, due to the country’s 1925 minority
law. Unique in Europe at that time, the law allowed for the creation of minority cultural self-
governments—public-legal bodies elected by voluntarily constituted “communities of persons,”
with powers to administer public and private schools and other minority cultural institutions, and
funding from state and local government as well as additional taxes levied on enrolled members of
the minority community (Laurits 2008; Smith 2016).
The attention given to this law, however, occludes the fact that NCA was only one facet of a
liberal minority rights regime in an interwar state where minorities made up just 12% of the
population. Thus, NCA was adopted by the small and territorially dispersed Baltic German and
Jewish minorities, whereas the claims of the larger, more compactly settled Russian- and Swedish-
speaking populations were addressed territorially, through a system of administrative decentrali-
zation allowing for dual public language use and native-language schooling in districts where
minorities made up a substantial share of the local population. The plaudits given to the NCA law
also overlook the nationalizing turn that occurred in Estonia following the onset of authoritarian
rule in 1934. NCA was never abolished, but assumed a far more “symbolic” character (Smith and
Hiden 2012).
German and Jewish NCA ended during 1939–1940, when the Nazi-Soviet Molotov-Ribbentrop
Pact paved the way for Estonia’s forcible incorporation into the USSR. This act was condemned as
an illegal annexation by the international community, which insisted that Estonia remained a de
jure independent state under Soviet occupation. From 1987, this legal continuity argument became
the cornerstone of an Estonian national movement demanding the restoration of the pre-1940
Republic. Within this framework, the concept of minority NCA also reappeared in political
discourse, prompting debates that eventually led to the adoption of legislation two years after
Estonia finally re-attained fully sovereign statehood in 1991.
This contemporary NCA law, however, was introduced into a context wholly different from that
of the inter-war period. The intervening decades of de facto Soviet rule had seen the share of “non-
core” ethnic groups within Estonia’s population grow to 39%, through centrally-directed
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movement of (mainly Russian-speaking) workers fromother republics of theUSSR.While Estonian
retained official status as the “titular national” language within the Estonian Soviet Socialist
Republic (ESSR), new settlers and their families were not required to learn it, since Russian also
served as de facto official language across the entire USSR. By the 1980s, many Estonians perceived
an economically failing Soviet system as synonymous with colonization and forced Russification,
compounding a suppressed collective memory of historical injustice and repression during the
1940s.
This Soviet legacy posed many challenges for state and nation-building once the Estonian
Republic was restored. The period 1991–1993 in particular saw the rise of a majority nationalism
that securitized the large Russian-speaking share of the population as a threat both to state
sovereignty and to the survival of Estonian language and culture. This discourse also invoked the
principle of legal continuity, leading to a decision whereby only citizens of the pre-1940 republic
and their descendants were given automatic entitlement to Estonian citizenship. The remaining
30% of the population (most of them Russian-speaking) were only entitled to obtain citizenship
through a naturalization process requiring three (later five) years’ permanent residence from 1990
and a knowledge of the Estonian language. In this way,most of Estonia’s Russian-speaking residents
were excluded from the political community in the immediate aftermath of independence, ensuring
that ethnic Estonians would exercise dominance within state institutions for the 1990s and beyond.
At first sight, Estonia’s 1993 NCA law thus appears anomalous within early state- and nation-
building processes that were otherwise highly exclusionary toward “noncore” ethnic groups. I will
argue, however, that the lawwas intended at least in part to justify these exclusionary practices in the
eyes of an external audience, at a time when Estonia had just entered the Council of Europe (CoE)
and was already seeking membership in the European Union (EU). In this context, a law offering
autonomy to “national minorities” could be cited as proof that Estonia was reviving its historic
tradition of tolerance in the area. At the same time, by limiting the definition of national minority to
citizens possessing “long-term, sound and permanent ties with Estonia,” this same law drew a clear
line of distinction between “genuine”minorities with pre-1940 roots on the one hand, and Soviet-
era settlers and their descendants (“noncitizens”) on the other. The latter, it was argued, were
immigrants, which, as inWestern democracies, should be expected to naturalize on terms set by the
majority. Talk of “restoring” cultural autonomy, moreover, overlooks important differences
between the 1925 NCA law and the 1993 iteration, which does not define the legal status of
autonomy bodies and gives them none of the powers and funding guarantees offered in the 1920s
(Poleshchuk 2013).
Existing literature therefore mostly dismisses the 1993 law as “performative” (symbolic) rather
than “instrumental” in character (Aidarov and Drechsler 2011). Although Estonia later took
important steps to facilitate the naturalization and “integration” of noncitizens during its accession
to the EU,NCAhas long been regarded as having no real practical significance for the governance of
ethno-cultural diversity. The debate, however, has not ended: “small, motivated” (Poleshchuk 2013,
160) Ingrian Finnish and Swedishminorities created autonomies in 2004 and 2007 and their leaders
have called for NCA to be given greater substance; amidst a continued growth in the number of
Russian-speakers with citizenship (and a contraction of state-funded Russian-language education),
three separate applications for Russian NCA were submitted during 2006–2009.2
The fact that none of these Russian NCA applications were approved by the government
highlights a continued securitization ofminority issues—in particular, the fear of external influence
fromRussia.Mikko Lagerspetz (2014) has criticized this approach, suggesting thatNCA could serve
as a way of accommodating continued claims for expanded Russian minority rights, especially in
education. Lagerspetz (2014, 465) argues that in 1993 Estonia adopted an NCA law “closely
reminiscent” of its 1925 predecessor. In so doing it accrued goodwill both internationally and
amongst its minorities. However, it has since failed to implement this law (2014, 457–458)—
something Lagerspetz characterizes as the “erosion of a promise.” If one takes—as Lagerspetz
does—the 1993 NCA law as the main focus, then this claim seems overstated, for the problem lies
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not only in implementation, but in the law’s limited provisions and its restrictive definition of
“minority.” Archival sources consulted for the present article, however, reveal the existence of an
earlier, more substantial NCA draft from July 1991 that actually did replicate most features of the
interwar legislation. In this sense, talk of a promise eroded carries more weight. Yet, the same
sources highlight widespread skepticism toward NCA among Russians already in 1991, something
which Lagespetz does not fully take into account and which has implications for his arguments
regarding present-day applicability of the model.
The existence of the earlier NCA draft also raises the question of why it gave way to the much-
diluted final law of October 1993, and how domestic and international factors interacted to produce
this outcome. Exploring this process sheds new light not only on the specifics of state- and nation-
building in Estonia, but also on the “diffuse and complex” (Waterbury 2010, 18) interaction of
states, minorities, external homelands, and international organizations that Smith (2002a) calls the
“Quadratic Nexus.”
The Quadratic Nexus Revisited
In order to understand the dynamics of state- and nation-building in contemporary Estonia, it is
important to look first at domestic factors—the interplay between the state-building nationalism of
the Estonian majority and the countervailing claims of local minorities, as well as the interplay of
competing elites operating within these two fields. In the case of Estonia, most attention has
understandably been devoted to the relationship between the new national state and its large
Russian-speaking population. At the same time, due attention must be paid to the “politics of
ethnicity within the international arena” (Mylonas 2013, i)—the geostrategic situation of the state at
the time nation-building debates are taking place. In the Estonian case, this obviously brings into
focus external relations with first the USSR and later the Russian Federation, as sites for a
“homeland nationalism” field forming the third node in Brubaker’s original triadic nexus. Bruba-
ker, however, overlooked a further “conceptual player” (Pettai 2006)—the global, European and
Euro-Atlantic intergovernmental organizations (UN, OSCE, CoE, EU) shaping the international
context within which the triadic nexus has operated. It is this consideration that prompted Smith
(2002a) to add a “fourth field” to the nexus, comprising the international standards on minority
rights that had begun to take shape since the start of the 1990s. In the course of that decade, the
aforementioned intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) became important “domestic policy
actors” within processes of post-communist state- and nation-building, providing incentives and
disincentives for states to adapt to international standards in the field of minority protection.
(Jurado 2003; Kelley 2004).
How, though, were concepts of “minority” and “minority rights” defined within this framework?
The UN, OSCE, CoE, and EU are all inter-governmental organizations, and in this respect the
governments that have debated this issue have never been able to agree on a single accepted
definition that goes beyond general declaratory principles. Since the 1960s, international efforts to
create a generic provision applicable to all ethno-cultural minorities have met with objections from
“New World” countries established on the basis of large-scale immigration (and assimilation of
immigrants). These have “insisted that immigrant groups do not count as ‘ethnic, religious or
linguistic minorities’ and, hence, that the provision only applied to historic minorities in OldWorld
countries created as a result of population transfers or the moving of international boundaries”
(Kymlicka 2007, 45–46). A similar trend was apparent in Europe at the start of the 1990s, when
Western states emphasized that the designation of “minority” could not be applied to immigrants
(Burgess 1999).
Yet, even if one accepts this distinction, how should the rights of “historic”minorities be defined,
and how does the concept of autonomy figure within this? In this respect, too, emerging interna-
tional standards reflected the interplay of different actors with different agendas (Dembinska et al
2014, 356). The June 1990 Copenhagen Document of the OSCE was ambitious in scope, citing
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“the establishment of appropriate local or autonomous administrations corresponding to the
specific historical and territorial circumstances” as “one of the possible means to protect and create
conditions for the promotion of the ethnic, cultural, linguistic and religious identity of certain
national minorities.”3 This suggestion, however, has proved deeply controversial, with a line of
division apparent between those actors who insist on “the collective right to some form of
governance necessary to maintaining minority communities within their historic territories” (the
“territorial principle”) and those who “prioritize the territorial stability of existing states”
(Dembinska et al 2014, 356). The former view has been upheld by states (most notably Hungary)
with large external “kin”minorities, whereas states hosting large and concentrated minorities have
insisted that minority rights can only be attached to individuals rather than communities. At the
same time, many of the minorities in question were mobilized in support of collective rights to self-
governance, activating a “rights vs. security” dilemma that was especially acute following the
conflicts in the former Yugoslavia (Kymlicka 2007; Malloy 2015). As described later in this article,
it was precisely this dilemma that sparked interest in NCA as a potential “middle way” between
“banalization and balkanization” (Roshwald 2007).
The preceding discussion supports Smith’s (2002a, 11) claim that international minority rights
standards—like the three nodes of Brubaker’s original triadic nexus—constitute “a variably
configured and continuously contested political field” in which actors making up the state,
minority, and external homeland fields have competed to advance their own particular political
agendas. While the structure of the international system means that state actors have carried the
most weight, the interventionist role of international organizations has also allowed minority
nationalists to engage in “forum shopping” (Chandler 1999), as they seek to bring indirect pressure
to bear on the state in which they reside. In sum, then, one can say that although norms guide states,
“context and politics… determine the kind of minority regime that will be adopted” (Dembinska
et al 2014, 359–360). In this respect, the line taken by international organizations onminority issues
is influenced by the interplay between the geopolitical and security interests of different states and
overall balance of power within the organization in question (Burgess 1999, 54).
The initial elaboration of the international minority rights regime overlapped with the
re-emergence of the Baltic States onto the world stage and the formative period of state- and
nation-building in each of these three countries during the early-mid 1990s (Hogan-Brun and
Wright 2013, 253). This fact is highly significant, since a desire to “return to Europe” (or, more
broadly, to the “Western World”) had figured strongly in the discourse of the Baltic popular
movements already from 1989. Upon the restoration of their independence in 1991, Estonia, Latvia,
and Lithuania immediately acceded tomembership in the United Nations and the OSCE. They also
quickly set the goal of gaining membership in the CoE and EU, being “especially open” to influence
from these latter organizations in the area of state and nation-building (Pettai and Kallas 2009). As
noted above, however, all of the above-mentioned organizations were themselves undergoing a
process of rapid internal change at that time, while the nature of the relationships between them
(and their existing constituent members) was still far from clear. This made them a moving target
for aspiringmembers, perhaps nowheremore so than in the still emerging and vaguely-defined field
ofminority rights. In what follows, I examine developments Estonia since 1988within the quadratic
nexus framework, exploring the shifting relationship between the (reemerging) state, its “core” and
“noncore” ethnic groups, the USSR and Russia and the international organizations most active in
the sphere of minority rights, and considering how the concept of cultural autonomy was
understood and deployed instrumentally by different actors within this process.
The Quadratic Nexus in Action: Estonia and Autonomy Debates Since 1988
The domestic “axis”within the nexus—namely, the relationship between the fields of “nationalizing
state” and “national minority” nationalism—first took shape in Estonia during April 1988–March
1990. This period sawmass mobilization of the titular nationality behind a new popular movement
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(the Popular Front of Estonia (PFE)) which co-opted reformist and nationally-minded elements
within the ruling Communist Party of Estonia (CPE) behind a pro-independence agenda, before
sweeping to power with a two-thirds majority in March 1990 elections to the Supreme Soviet
(parliament) of the ESSR. Already prior to this, parliament had declared the sovereignty of the ESSR
(November 1988) and asserted the primacy of its titular nationality through a January 1989 law
making Estonian the sole official language. By inverting pre-existing ethnic and linguistic hierar-
chies within Soviet Estonia, these and other policies elicited an attempted counter-mobilization
under the auspices of the InternationalistMovement of the ESSR (Intermovement), which appealed
for external intervention by the federal government to curb the sovereignty movement and defend
the interests of the “Russian-speaking part of the population.”
In the face of this challenge, the Estonian nationalist field was shaped by competition between
the PFE and a more radical challenger—the Citizens’ Committee movement (later Citizens’
Congress). Both movements were committed to re-establishing an independent nation-state with
an Estonian ethno-cultural “core.” Both also espoused the doctrine of legal continuity, which
acquired tremendous mobilizing power during 1988–1990. They differed fundamentally, however,
in their assessment of the geostrategic context and, by extension, their strategies for attaining
independence and—in the longer term—nation-building.
Whereas the PFE and its allies were working through existing Soviet institutions to achieve an
incremental devolution of power leading to eventual independence, the former dissident-led
Citizens’ Committees saw uncompromising adherence to the legal continuity principle as the only
viable means of ending Soviet “occupation” and “colonization” and restoring an Estonian nation-
state. Characterizing the large population of post-1940 Russian-speaking settlers and their descen-
dants as a “civil garrison of the empire”whose votes would block any attempt to gain independence
through Soviet structures, themovement set about registering pre-1940 citizens of Estonia and their
descendants for elections to an alternative parliament, the Citizens’ Congress, which it deemed the
only body legitimately empowered to decide on Estonia’s future. For the Congress, Estonia could
not declare independence from the USSR, since it had never legally ceased to exist as a sovereign
state. The issue was rather one of effecting an unconditional end to occupation through the
withdrawal of Soviet troops and de facto restoration of diplomatic links with the outside world.
TheCongress enjoyedundoubtedmoral authority amongst theEstonian population.Nevertheless,
in the geopolitical conditions of 1988–1990 the PFE could—quite plausibly—characterize its rival’s
position as unrealistic. The Soviet government was not about to voluntarily relinquish its control over
the Baltic states; moreover, as the case of Lithuania in March 1990 demonstrates, Western govern-
ments were notwilling to risk wider destabilizationwithin theUSSRby extending de facto recognition
to the newly-elected Baltic governments. Independence therefore depended on persuading the
international community to exert pressure that would bring Soviet leader Mikhail Sergeyevich
Gorbachev to the negotiating table. PFE and its allies also cited “the political reality that Russians
[made] up 30% of the population.”4 Branding the Soviet-era settlers who constituted most of this
group “occupants” with no right to a say in Estonia’s future, PFE argued, would simply encourage
them to follow Intermovement’s lead and look outside Estonia to Moscow for defense of their
interests.
Gorbachev was unwilling to authorize the forcible suppression of Estonia’s (entirely peaceful)
national movement, for to have done so would have destroyed his reformist credentials domesti-
cally while prejudicing hopes of financial support from theWest. To a large extent, therefore, claims
of systematic discrimination against Russian-speakers advanced by the Intermovement-Moscow
axis were intended to undermine the credentials of the Baltic independence movements interna-
tionally, by exploiting “transborder concern with human rights” (Brubaker 1996). In this situation,
PFE and its allies adopted a cautious and pragmatic line on the “nationalities question.” Being
themselves constrained by the legal continuity discourse, they deferred the question of citizenship
until full independence was finally achieved. At the same time, they argued that any permanent
resident of Estonia wishing to obtain citizenship should be allowed to do so without preconditions.
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The January 1989 Language Law adopted under PFE pressure also retained a provision for public
use of Russian. This was followed in December 1989 by a “Law onNational Rights of Citizens of the
ESSR,” declaring that “as a sovereign democratic state, the ESSR guarantees equal political, social
and economic rights and freedoms to all of its citizens, regardless of nationality.” “Alongside the
development of Estonian language and culture,” it would “create for national groups conditions for
the free development of their language and culture, including education in Estonian, Russian or
another language via state educational institutions or cultural associations.”5
This approach undercut efforts by Intermovement and its allies in Moscow to mobilize a
“minority field” in opposition to independence. In March 1990, with the support of around one-
third of the Russian-speaking electorate, the PFE-led bloc obtained the two-thirdsmajority required
to declare independence under the terms of the Soviet constitution. Instead, the new parliament
declared an end to Soviet occupation and the start of a transitional period to full independence, to be
achieved through negotiations with Moscow. The next 18 months witnessed a further growth in
support for independence among local “Russian-speakers,” as seen in a March 1991 referendum
that delivered an overall 78% majority in favor, on an 89% turnout.
One crucial factor in this evolution was the parallel emergence of a sovereign Russian Republic
(RSFSR) under the leadership of Boris Yeltsin, which declared a democratic, pro-Western orien-
tation and supported Estonia’s claim to sovereignty. In this way, Russia was able to eclipse the USSR
as an imagined “external homeland” for Estonia’s Russians. Keen to develop this axis in order to
undermine Soviet power, Estonia’s parliament assured Russia that it would guarantee local
Russians’ civil rights and grant them cultural autonomy (Lagerspetz 2014, 464). Later, in January
1991, an Estonian-Russian inter-state treaty was signed, containing clauses on future citizenship.
Responding to concerns that the latter were excessively vague, Stanislav Stystovii of the Human
Rights Committee of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet replied that “I do not think Estonia will be worse
than any of the European countries about which no questions are asked regarding minority
populations” (Virov 1991).
NCA Enters Political Debate
By the time Stystovii made this comment, “minority rights” was already becoming established on
the European political agenda through discussions at the CSCE and Council of Europe. After the
ESSR gave way to the sovereign Estonian Republic in March 1990, “minority” also displaced the
Soviet term “nationality” within Estonian political discourse. In January 1991 a parliamentary
Committee on Inter-Ethnic Relations established an expert academic working group to prepare
new legislation “on the Political, Social and Cultural Rights of National Minorities,” to allow for the
realization of the citizen rights laid out in the December 1989 law adopted by the previous,
Communist-led government.6 Citing a “demand to unite the forces of the core nation and national
minorities living in the Estonian Republic around deepening Estonia’s political, economic and
cultural development,” the first draft of this legislation (“on cultural self-administration of minor-
ities”) was substantially based upon the 1925 minority law of the interwar Estonian Republic. For
instance, the law endowed minority governments with tax-raising powers, while also providing for
local authority schools (and existing funding) to be transferred to minority self-government
control. The category of “minority,” however, extended to Russians, Ukrainians, Belarussians,
Karelian-Finns, Jews, Tatars, Latvians, Lithuanians, Poles, and any other group numbering over
3,000, as well as groups that were smaller but had enjoyed rights to NCA under the 1925 law.7
The NCA approach captured the aspirations voiced by cultural societies representing Estonia’s
smaller ethnic communities (including Swedes and Ingrian Finns). Formed already in 1988, these had
made common cause with Estonian nationalism in rejecting the Russifying thrust of Soviet nation-
alities policy and had formed their own umbrella Nationalities Forum (renamed Union of National
Minorities in April 1989) within the framework of PFE. Although representing a numerically
small share of the overall population, these societies helped to rebut Soviet claims of a monolithic
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“Russian-speaking” community, subject to discrimination and opposed to Estonian independence.
They did, however, establish their own “minority field” based on claims for cultural autonomy, which
was discussed already at PFE’s Founding Congress in October 1988 (Lagerspetz 2014, 464).
Yet, the group that prepared the 1991 law saw NCA as catering not just for these smaller
minorities, but for all noncore ethnic groups, stating that it would assist the 475,000-strong “Slavic”
population (Russians, Russified Ukrainians, and Belorussians) to adapt to life as aminority in a new
Estonian-led state, by giving them a culturally autonomous space through which they could
participate.8 In this regard, the authors of the draft highlighted the reputation of the 1925 law,
arguing that “a better mechanism for defense of national minorities [had] yet to be elaborated
anywhere in the world,” and that interwar Estonia had gone much further than neighboring
countries in terms of minority protection.9 The draft thus spoke to the key legitimating principles
of legal continuity and restoration within the Estonian nationalist field, while also affirming
Estonia’s credentials within an emerging international minority rights field that already contained
reference to principles of “autonomous administration.” The draft also spoke to pre-existing
conceptions of collective nationality rights in a democratizing Russia, where NCA had also been
discussed within wider perestroika debates. In this regard, it is notable that the draft law was
submitted to external scrutiny by bothWestern experts and the Institute of International Affairs in
Moscow, after which reference was added to the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR)
and the CSCE Paris Declaration.
In Estonia itself, however, NCA received only a lukewarm reception within the Russian
“minority field,” thereby prompting further debate within Estonia’s government. Initial feedback
from Artur Kuznetsov, Estonia’s Minister for Nationalities, for instance, questioned the claim that
NCA had general applicability. Seeing insufficient evidence that smaller ethnic groups actually
wanted formal public-legal autonomy (as opposed to their own NGOs), Kuznetsov also noted that
the December 1989 law already envisaged a role for the Forum of Nationalities, while providing for
the continued existence of state-administered Russian-language schools in areas where Russian-
speakers made up a substantial share of the population. The new draft law, however, provided for
such education only within the framework of NCA.10 Indeed, the territorial paradigm adopted
under the 1989 law seems to have been the most favored option among Russians at the time: pre-
existing practices of the Soviet period meant that equal rights as a citizen (and taxpayer) were taken
to imply that the state should directly provide education in one’s mother tongue, rather than
devolving this task to an autonomously organized community (Kekelidze 1992). In this regard,
Aksel Kirch (a member of the expert academic group on NCA) argued in an August 2015 interview
with the author that the principle ofminority rights was at odds with a Soviet legacy which in theory
provided for equality of all nationalities, but in practice prioritized the use of Russian.
The Geostrategic Shift of Fall 1991
The aforementioned debates meant that submission of the revised NCA draft to the government—
originally scheduled for July 1991—only took place in late September. By this time, however, the
failed Moscow coup against Gorbachev had suddenly and unexpectedly opened the way to
international recognition of an independent Estonia. On August 20 the Citizens’ Congress backed
a resolution by the “official” parliament declaring the immediate restoration of the Estonian
Republic and calling upon longer-established states to restore formal diplomatic relations severed
in 1940. In return, the Congress obtained an equal share of seats in a future Constituent Assembly, a
development which completely reconfigured power relationships within the Estonian nationalist
field.
Subsequent unconditional recognition as a restored state also accorded Estonia a “privileged
place in the West’s geopolitical imagination as culturally and politically nearer to Western Europe
than the other post-Soviet states” (Smith 1999, 514), opening up the prospect of accession to the EU
and NATO on the same terms as Poland and Hungary. In conjunction with the simultaneous
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unraveling of the USSR, this completely fundamentally altered the geostrategic calculations around
state- and nation-building and the political discourse on citizenship and “minority rights.” In so far
as the latter concept had hitherto been extended to cover Soviet-era settlers and their descendants,
this was largely due to strategic calculations around citizenship—namely, the expectation that it
would have to be made freely available to all residents in return for international recognition of
independence.11 The actual circumstances of recognition, however, provided external legitimation
for the Congress argument that automatic entitlement to citizenship should be limited to pre-1940
citizens and their descendants. This was the course taken by parliament inOctober 1991, aftermany
PFE members had defected to the Congress line on strict application of legal continuity. The terms
of the subsequent February 1992 naturalization law meant that applicants could not receive
citizenship in time to participate in new parliamentary elections scheduled for September 1992.
With the electorate now 90% ethnically Estonian (65% in 1990), dominance for the “titular”
nationality within political institutions was—in the immediate term, at least—assured.
This nationalizing turn in policy reflected the enhanced political influence of forces drawn from
the Citizens’ Congress, which were now able to frame the large Russian-speaking population as a
threat to the goal of restoring an Estonian-led nation-state aligned politically and economically with
the West. Securitization of minority issues was exacerbated by deteriorating relations with Russia,
which, as the legal successor to the USSR, assumed the latter’s international obligations, including
responsibility for negotiating the withdrawal of former Soviet troops from Estonia. While the
Russian government had previously agreed to this, it was not about to acquiesce to Estonia’s policy
of legal restorationism by being held accountable for the 1940 Soviet occupation of the Baltic States.
Consistent with the line articulated by Stanislav Stystovii in January 1991, Russian representatives
duly contested the international-legal validity of Estonia’s citizenship policy through the multilat-
eral fora of the United Nations and CSCE.
Yet the dispute with Estonia was but one facet of a wider shift in Russian state- and nation-
building during 1992–1993: Boris Yeltsin’s initial “Atlanticist” foreign policy course gave way to a
“Statist” discourse asserting claims to a dominant role within the former Soviet space, while the civic
“new Russian nationalism” of 1990–1991 was challenged by calls for amore assertive line of defense
of Russian-speaking “Compatriots” abroad. The two strands converged at the CSCE summit in
Helsinki in June 1992, where Russia argued that continued troop withdrawal from Estonia should
be contingent on changes to recent citizenship legislation. Although unsuccessful, this and other
interventions by Russia aroused concern within the key organizations (NATO and the EU) that
Estonia was now seeking to join in order to obtain credible external guarantees for sovereignty of the
restored state. While member governments of both organizations had subscribed to the legal
continuity argument, they feared that its application in the sphere of citizenship might generate a
backlash from the 30% of Estonia’s residents excluded from political participation. In an interna-
tional context where ethnopolitical issues were viewed primarily through the prism of security, this
opened up the possibility that Russia (and/or ethnic Russians within Estonia) might successfully
utilize the “fourth field” of minority rights to bring indirect pressure to bear upon Estonia.
In seeking to reconcile the internal and external dimensions of state restoration, Estonian actors
could, however, exploit the ambiguity surrounding international minority rights “norms,” by citing
existing practices toward immigrants inWestern democracies: thus, noncitizens willing and able to
undergo naturalization on the terms set could, in time, become a member of the political
community; moreover, these terms were generous compared to many states in the West. Estonian
policymakers were, though, aware that international organizations would apply different standards
when assessing applicant states from CEE than they would in the case of established democracies,
and that Estonia would be expected to demonstrate “respect for and protection of minorities” in
order to join the EU. A further precondition would be gaining membership in the CoE, which was
already beginning to draft its own instruments and requirements concerning minority rights.12
Thus, while legislative progress was interrupted by processes of constitutional and institutional
change during the first months of restored statehood, a law on national minorities remained a
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highly relevant concern. In this regard, NCA also remained part of political discourse: reference to
the right of cultural autonomy for national minorities was included in Article 50 of Estonia’s new
constitution adopted in June 1992, and the adoption of legislation giving this effect was named as a
priority by the new right-of-center coalition government formed in October 1992. This followed
elections which, predictably, returned only one nonethnic Estonian MP (Ants-Enno Lõhmus, an
ethnic Swede and Chairman of the Union of National Minorities) to the 101-seat parliament
(Melvin 1995, 45) and resulted in a victory for nationalist political parties drawn from the former
Citizens’ Congress.
Meeting external requirements relating to minority rights nevertheless entailed a difficult
balancing act for the new coalition, as parliamentary debates on the NCA law during June-
October 1993 clearly show. While the government emphasized integration with the West, more
uncompromising elements within its core nationalist parties opposed even granting naturalization
rights to Soviet-era settlers, arguing that these were “occupants” whose “repatriation” should be
actively encouraged. Those who did remain in Estonia should be viewed as akin to Gastarbeiter in
Germany (Smith 1998). Should the naturalization option be widely exercised, this would increase
the number of Russian-speakers holding citizenship and thereby able to claim rights commensurate
to those of a “genuine” nationalminority. For some radical nationalistMPs, this was too high a price
to pay for entry to European organizations, which were important only insofar as they remained
committed to reversing Soviet occupation and restoring Estonians’ position as “masters in the
house.” One speaker, for instance, claimed that talk of minority autonomy was “unethical” when
ethnic Estonians made up only 61% of the total population, and risked sending a misleading
signal.13 Another argued that while under normal circumstances minorities enrich any state in
which they live, Estonia was not yet a “normal” state.14
Estonia’s entry to the CoE was actually confirmed on May 30, 1993, already prior to the start of
parliamentary debates on NCA. However, even the limited commitments made by the government
during this process proved highly controversial (Smith 2002b). Speakers in the NCA debates also
cited a February 1993 Resolution by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE)
calling for an additional protocol on national minorities to be added to the (legally binding) ECHR.
Controversially, this referred to the right to autonomy within regions where minorities lived
compactly.
The presenters of the NCA bill nevertheless emphasized that a specific minority law was
necessary in order to demonstrate Estonia’s observance of “principles accepted by the democratic
states of Europe,”15 all the more so given Russia’s accusations of systematic rights violations. One
oppositionMP, for instance, asked why the NCA law should even use the term “minority,”when no
state in the world had yet managed to define this effectively.16 In response, one of the presenters
cited considerations of “propaganda,” given that the law “may come into the hands of foreigners
who are not so familiar with our legislation.”17 The timing of the bill’s introduction—in June 1993—
is indeed noteworthy, coinciding with a fresh international controversy arising from two other laws
adopted during the samemonth—a “Law on Aliens” requiring noncitizens to obtain new residence
permits within a year, and an education law stipulating that state-funded Russian-language upper
secondary schools should transfer to teaching entirely in Estonian by 2000.
Against this background, NCA was instrumentalized as a way of squaring the circle between
internal and external requirements of state-building. Externally, the claim that minority NCA was
being “restored” alongwith the EstonianRepublic could be offered as proof of tolerance and state-of-
the-art thinking. In this respect, one MP observed that the CSCE had highlighted NCA as an ideal
“middle way” between assimilation and territorial autonomy.18 As already noted, however, the bill
placed before parliament only superficially resembled the original draft—closely modeled on the
1925 law—produced two years earlier: while retaining the complex procedures for electing cultural
self-governments, it gave them none of the public powers or funding guarantees for institutions.
More importantly, by defining “national minorities” as citizens with firm and longstanding ties to
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Estonia, the law limited the term to inter-war citizens and their descendants. While this category
included perhaps one in every five Russian speaking residents, most were excluded.
This denial of minority status partly explains the reportedly negative attitude to the NCA law
amongst Russian-speaking elites in Estonia. At that time, these lacked representatives in parliament
who could have made their opinions known. However, the view was communicated via a Round
Table of Nationalities established (following CSCE recommendations) in June 1993. A further
objection, according to one presenter of the NCA bill, derived from the fact that autonomy was not
based on the territorial principle.19 Another presenter expanded on this point, stating that the law
was intended for smaller minorities whose problems derived from their size. This did not apply in
the case of the large Russian population, whose needs were already catered for in Estonia. NCA was
therefore of no use to Russians.20
As seen already in 1988–1991, the NCA model was of greater interest to the smaller ethnic
groups represented within the Union of National Minorities. Indeed, the Union’s Chairman
Lõhmus co-presented the NCA bill in parliament. Yet, even for smaller ethno-cultural communi-
ties, the law had limited relevance, for (with the exception of the Swedishminority) the citizen/non-
citizen divide cut across all noncore ethnic groups. Under these circumstances, it was simpler and
more practical to establish an NGO that could accommodate all members of a given community—
all the more so given that autonomy bodies possessed few, if any, additional rights compared
to NGOs.
In sum, then, the 1993 NCA Law can indeed be characterized as a symbolic piece of legislation
intended to further codify the dominant position of the ethnic majority within the state. Revealing
in this regard is the comment by the bill’s co-presenter, Mart Nutt. Responding to a question on the
PACE recommendation for an additional ECHR protocol on minorities—and the claim that, by
using the term “minority” in the law, parliament risked “legislating Estonia into a ‘multinational
state’”—Nutt insisted that “if the additional protocol is ratified, all states will have to deal with this
question. I’msure that, in this regard, Estonia will be nomore of amultinational state than France or
Germany.”21 His point of reference for Estonia’s future was therefore two states with large
immigrant populations, but either no or few recognized “national minorities.”
Implementation of the 1993 Law
Nutt’s reading of the future was essentially correct, since Estonia’s subsequent “Europeanization”
has not challenged the project of building a unitary, one-society nation-state (Csergő and Regel-
mann 2017a, 2017b). The main external focus during the 1997–2004 EU accession process was on
moving beyond the exclusionist discourses of the early 1990s, reducing the number of noncitizens
and pushing the state toward a more pro-active strategy of integration. The favored model can be
characterized as multicultural integration (Kymlicka and Norman 2000, 12) in that the EU insisted
on amending the original education law to allow for continued bilingual Estonian-Russian tuition
in state-funded upper secondary schools previously teaching only in Russian. While this approach
blurs the distinction between “immigrant” and “national”minority, the norms of accommodation
promoted by the EU and other international organizations have—despite initial OSCE and CoE
interest in “collectively pursued minority rights” during the early 1990s—focused more on
“individualist politics of non-discrimination” (Csergő and Regelmann 2017b, 2). This approach,
in effect, has been the only common denominator upon which different states in the contested
international minority rights field can agree.
Within this context, NCA has had very marginal significance in Estonia. Local Finnish and
Swedish minority leaders clearly attached great importance even to the symbolic autonomy made
available in 1993, and through concerted efforts were able to establish cultural self-governments.
Both have since lobbied for further development of the NCA law, but by 2012 these efforts had run
their course, amidst government concerns that a more substantive framework might prompt
further calls to establish a Russian NCA.22 Lagerspetz (2014) calls this view misguided, arguing
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that a Russian NCA would enhance state security by improving dialogue and helping to address
continued contestations around historical memory and education reform. As argued in the present
article, however, Lagerspetz’s claim of a “promise eroded” onNCA—while perhaps applicable in the
case of Finns and Swedes—appears less credible when it comes to the Russian-speaking population.
For, even when a fuller NCA framework was on the table in 1991, interest amongst local Russians
was limited.
Analysis of the late Soviet period points to growing Russian support for a sovereign Estonia
during 1988–1991, when the pragmatic approach of PFE and cooperation with the pro-democracy
movement in Russia offered the prospect of full citizenship and a status as “one of two constituent
groups” (Poleshchuk 2015, 243) within a new, post-Soviet state. Given the Soviet legacy, most
Russians in Estonia could not conceive of themselves as aminority, and there was an understanding
that citizenship implied entitlement to publicly-funded education in and public use of the Russian
language. The small part of the Russian population that was linked to pre-Soviet Estonia, mean-
while, could recall an experience of territorially-based minority provision appropriate to the needs
of a compactly settled group. There was, therefore, no legacy of Russian NCA on which to draw.
What actually transpired after August 1991 was undoubtedly a source of disillusionment and
alienation for those Russians who had supported independence only to be denied automatic rights
to citizenship and participation within the new state. Yet, with most Russians having never
previously considered themselves part of a national minority, mobilization along ethno-linguistic
lines has been limited. Instead, Russians have sought to articulate their collective interests through
support for the mainstream and cross-ethnic Centre Party, the main successor party to PFE. The
right of all permanent residents to vote in local elections (regardless of citizenship) has brought the
party to power in Tallinn and the north-eastern cities where Russians live compactly, providing a
platform for defending inherited rights to Russian-language schooling. A continued growth in the
number of Russian-speakers with Estonian citizenship, meanwhile, has bolstered the Centre’s
national standing, bringing it into the ruling coalition in November 2016.
The fact that four applications for Russian NCA have been submitted during the past 20 years
shows that the autonomy discourse has been deployed instrumentally by parts of the Russian-
speaking elite. Before the 2007 parliamentary elections, for instance, the (now defunct) Russian
Party of Estonia portrayed NCA as a mechanism for preserving Russian-language schooling in the
face of the impending switch to bilingual education at upper secondary level.23 The proposal did not
receive widespread backing, however; indeed, when an umbrella organization of RussianNGOswas
consulted on the application, it withheld its support. Here, critics rightly pointed out that since
autonomy bodies can establish only private schools, establishing NCA ran the risk of weakening the
case for continued state-funded education in Russian, thereby diluting an existing provision and
exacerbating Russian-speakers’ marginalization (Semenov 2006).
Conclusion
This article has provided the first comprehensive analysis of the background to Estonia’s NCA law,
situating the debates of 1988–1993 and the subsequent practice of NCA within the quadratic nexus
framework. In so doing, it illustrates how the NCA concept has been deployed instrumentally by
elites operating within different ethnopolitical fields. It also shows how these fields (and the
interaction between them) have been shaped by broader geostrategic understandings and an
international minority rights discourse which (from 1988–2004, at least) provided a common
frame of reference for all parties implicated in the process of Estonian state- and nation-building.
As regards the Estonian nationalist field, the geostrategic situation of 1988–1991 dictated an
acceptance of Soviet legacies, through making citizenship freely available to all residents and
providing substantive collective rights for a large national minority population within a revived
Estonian-led state. In this respect, the 1925 law on NCA came into focus as a “usable past,”
consistent not only with legal continuity of statehood but also with contemporary Western (and
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Russian-government) thinking on the accommodation of ethnic diversity. The actual cir-
cumstances of Estonia’s return to independence in autumn 1991, however, changed the geostrategic
calculation (and the balance of domestic political forces) completely: unconditional recognition
from the West on the basis of legal continuity (without active opposition from Russia or local
Russians) gave sanction for a citizenship policy that excluded most of Estonia’s “nontitular”
population from the category of national minority and instead reclassified them as immigrants,
to be integrated on terms set by the “titular” Estonian majority. The NCA concept remained
relevant in this new setting, partly in response to the continued claims of smaller, non-Russian
ethnic groups, but also because, in the early 1990s, collective minority rights were still perceived as
salient to the discourse of international organizations. In this sense, however, the (much-diluted)
law adopted in 1993 served an essentially symbolic and “performative” function.
In the still-fluid and uncertain geopolitical environment of the day, even symbolic deployment of
NCAwas unacceptable formore radical nationalists, who feared that this might leave the door open
for renewed and more far-reaching demands on the state in future. In reality, however, collective
rights have since slipped from the agenda of international organizations; by extension, NCA has
barely featured in subsequent discussions of Estonia, where—in the absence of any significant
ethnopolitical instability—external actors have seen little reason to question the integration
paradigm sponsored by the EU from the mid-1990s onward.
Reflecting on the more general evolution of international thinking on minority rights since the
early 1990s, Csergő andRegelmann (2017a) discern an underlying state-centric approach that views
minority mobilization as threatening and disruptive and, accordingly, treats minorities as objects of
(home- or “kin”-) state policy rather than political actors with their own agency. This same
approach arguably shaped early-1990s thinking which prescribed NCA as a less destabilizing
alternative to territorial autonomy claims, while giving little actual consideration to the perspectives
of minority actors themselves. In this regard, the current article sheds new light on the hitherto
neglected minority political field within the quadratic nexus and, in particular, on perspectives
amongst Estonia’s Russians. Adopting this approach gives grounds to question Lagerspetz’s (2014)
present-day advocacy of NCA as ameans of accommodating Russian claims in Estonia, for it shows
that, even in the very different political circumstances of early 1991, most local Russian actors were
unwilling to trade pre-existing entitlements for a model that confirmed “minority” status and
framed minority issues in terms of culture rather than participation and voice. The appeal of NCA
has been even more limited since 1991, in a situation where Russian political actors have been
“left … to their own devices,” caught between a “highly centralized majoritarian democrac[y]”
(Csergő and Regelmann 2017b, 215) and a putative “kin state” (Russia) that also seeks to control
and instrumentalize them for its own geostrategic ends (Kallas 2016). Against this background,
NCA has little to offer in terms of enhancing Russians’ own agency within local politics.
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Notes
1 Until 1994, OSCEwas known as theConference on Security andCooperation in Europe (CSCE).
2 A separate, much earlier application was submitted already in 1996, before the necessary
ordinances for setting up a national register had been drafted.
3 http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/14304?download=true, 20. (Accessed March 30, 2017.)
4 “O proekte zakona Estonskoi Respubliki ‘O politicheskikh, sotsial’nykh i kul’turnykh pravakh
natsional’nykh menshinstv,’ poriadke ego vyrabotki i vozmozhnykh na eto material’nykh
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zatratakh,”Eesti Vabariigi Ülemnõukogu Rahvussuhete Komisjon, Dokumendid Eesti Vabariigi
vähemusrahvuste kultuuriautonoomia seaduse väljatöötamise kohta, Eesti Rahvusarhiiv (ERA)
R-3.13.356.
5 ERA.R-3.13.356, page 18.
6 ‘Zakon o kul’turnom samoupredlenii natsional’nykh men’shinstv,” (ERA) R-3.13.356’, page 44.
7 ERA.R-3.13.356, pages 1–8 and page 44.
8 In an interviewwith the author in August 2015, Aksel Kirch drew an analogy with Estonia’s inter-
war Baltic German community for which the 1925 lawwas seen as a way of facilitating a transition
from a previously dominant imperial elite to national minority in an independent state.
9 ERA.R-3.13.356, page 34.
10 ‘Arvamus Eesti Vabariigi rahvusvähemuse kultuuriomavalitsuse seaduse eelnõu kohta,” ERA.R-
3.13.356, page 85.
11 This was the Russian government’s interpretation of the January 1991 inter-state treaty with
Estonia, which it used as the basis for recognizing Estonia’s independence on August 24.
12 Estonia applied for CoE membership in October 1991.
13 VII Riigikogu Stenogramm, September 30, 1993: 219.
14 VII Riigikogu Stenogramm, September 30, 1993: 219.
15 VII Riigikogu Stenogramm, September 30, 1993: 217.
16 VII Riigikogu Stenogramm, September 30, 1993: 220.
17 VII Riigikogu Stenogramm, September 30, 1993: 215.
18 VII Riigikogu Stenogramm, October 26, 1993: 427.
19 VII Riigikogu Stenogramm, September 30, 1993: 221.
20 VII Riigikogu Stenogramm, September 30, 1993: 221. As regards the territorially-based provi-
sion for Russians, the 1992 constitution allows the government to approve public use of other
languages alongside Estonian in municipalities where “national minorities” constitute over 50%
of the population. However, the definition of national minority under the NCA law (which
superseded the 1989 Law on National Rights of Citizens of the ESSR) rendered this criterion
inapplicable to Tallinn and the largely Russophone cities of the north-east, wheremost residents
were noncitizens.
21 VII Riigikogu Stenogramm, October 26, 1993: 424.
22 Interview with Kabanen 2012; interview with Kalm 2015.
23 Russkaya kulturnaya avtonomiya Estonii segodnya: istoriya, predposilki sozdaniya i perspeck-
tivi razvitiya. http://www.venekultuuriautonoomia.ee. (Accessed January 8, 2012).
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